Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorStørkersen, Kristine Vedal
dc.contributor.authorThorvaldsen, Trine
dc.contributor.authorKongsvik, Trond
dc.contributor.authorDekker, Sidney
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-29T11:40:30Z
dc.date.available2020-05-29T11:40:30Z
dc.date.created2020-05-17T07:53:36Z
dc.date.issued2020-08
dc.identifier.issn0925-7535
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2656029
dc.description.abstractOver the past decades, government safety management regulation has been driven by deregulation, simplification and organization-level regimes of inspection. So-called functional rule-making requires organizations to implement safety management systems appropriate for their operations. The paradox that seems to have arisen is that overregulation is common in many organizations. Research has found over-proceduralization, safety clutter, bureaucratic overload, and procedures not at the service of safety. To explore the paradoxical relationship between governmental deregulatory measures and organizational overregulation, we analyze empirical data from Norwegian fish farming and coastal transport. The data confirms that practitioners experience a rapidly grown abundance of internal rules and protocols, ill-fitting procedures, and pervasive, exaggerated safety management. We trace three mechanisms that have driven internal overregulation: work auditability; managerial insecurity and liability; and audit practices. These mechanisms show how functional regulation can have unintended consequences when it meets other accountability expectations. Expectations of market doctrine, bureaucratic entrepreneurism and control can lead a company transforming simple governmental regulations into vastly overcomplicated safety management systems. We conclude our study with prescriptions of how this aspect of safety could be done differently.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Ltden_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectDeregulationen_US
dc.subjectBureaucracyen_US
dc.subjectSafety managementen_US
dc.subjectFish farmsen_US
dc.subjectMaritimeen_US
dc.titleHow deregulation can become overregulation: An empirical study into the growth of internal bureaucracy when governments take a step backen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY licenseen_US
dc.source.volume128en_US
dc.source.journalSafety Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2020.104772
dc.identifier.cristin1811369
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel

Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal